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Abstract — This paper presents an analysis of corporate 
governance of the “new” Parmalat, born in the aftermath of the 
infamous financial scandal, and aims at verifying whether this 
new model of governance can be considered a best practice for 
Italian listed companies. Many papers have already highlighted 
that the Parmalat scandal was facilitated by bad governance 
which did not have an efficient system for the safeguarding of 
creditors and minority shareholders in presence of a family 
corporation. This paper presents the results of the comparison 
between the “old” and “new” rules of Parmalat corporate 
governance, highlighting the considerable differences in the 
composition and functions of the various company bodies. 
Moreover, an in-depth analysis of the efficacy of the external and 
internal control systems is also provided. The main points of 
strength which make it possible to consider the new Parmalat as 
a model of best practice in Italy are identified, although critical 
aspects are also pointed out. The paper concludes by making 
suggestions aimed at strengthening the model of corporate 
governance of Italian listed companies. 
Keywords: corporate governance, public company, Parmalat. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Parmalat is an Italian worldwide leading diary company 
whose financial scandal that broke out in December 2003 was 
widely covered by both the national and international press due 
to the fact that it was the biggest ever financial scandal in 
European corporate history (Buchanan, Yang, 2005). The 
Parmalat crisis was an opportunity for international 
researchers, media, etc. to study the Italian governance system. 
As a matter of fact, Italian governance had not previously been 
studied, therefore the case made it necessary to face the various 
critical aspects of governance in Europe compared with 
American and Aglosaxon model of governance. Parmalat is 
now a public company, and five years after the financial 
scandal it is striving to regain the trust of the markets, also by 
means of a governance model that is in keeping with the 
highest national and international standards. With reference to 
the Italian corporate governance system it was “historically 
considered poor, characterized by an inactive takeover market, 
weak accounting standards, limited presence of institutional 
investor and where the legal protection for investors was low” 
(Buchanan and al.). Besides, the Italian corporate governance 
system is characterised by a high degree of direct ownership 
concentration, both for listed and unlisted companies (Bianco, 
Casavola, 1999 and Enriques, Volpin, 2007). The Italian 
corporate governance system may be classified in the Latin 
sub-group (De Jong, 1999). However, it has its own unique 
features, and does not entirely fit into the international 
standards models (Melis, 1999)1. Finally the Italian corporate 
governance system is based on pyramidal firm structure. 
According to La Porta ed al. (2000) the strongest corporate 
governance system is the Anglosaxon one that offers the 
highest level of legal protection to stockholders. The Parmalat 
scandal has been a case study for different authors who 
explained, under different point of views, the reasons for the 
crisis focusing on the first cause of the Parmalat financial 
fraud: the corporate governance system. Melis (2005) showed 
that there was a huge concentration of power in a sole person in 
Parmalat. In fact, the controlling shareholder was able to hold 
the positions of Chairman and CEO of Parmalat Finanziaria. 
As Melis stated (2000) the high level of concentration of power 
in non financial listed companies is an Italian critical issue. 
Moreover, the author showed that Parmalat Corporate 
Governance wasn’t able to comply with some of the key 
existing Italian Corporate Governance standards of best 
practice, such as the presence of independent directors, the 
composition of the board of directors and, especially, of the 
internal control committee. Buchanan and al. showed how 
Parmalat’s failure was linked to “governance failures with 
particular reference to the conflict of interest between the 
controlling shareholder and the minority shareholders”. The 
authors sentenced that “the Parmalat bankruptcy was the result 
of the failed proper corporate governance, not inevitable 
business decline”. McCahery and Vermeulen (2005) focused 
their paper on Parmalat as it was an extremely unique case with 
reference to Special purpose entities (SPEs). In fact 
“management used a virtual hydra head of offshore subsidiaries 
and special purpose entities to cover up their losses and prop up 
the financial situation of the group”. Besides the Parmalat 
scandal was used by the author to exemplify the importance of 
the variety of legal techniques to curb related party 
                                                          
1 For the convergence of corporate governance in Europe see 
Wojcik (2006). 
transactions. Also Tabasso (2004) underlined that the Parmalat 
“fiasco” demonstrated the ineffectiveness of prevention and 
controls in many critical areas of the corporate world, 
prompting a serious reappraisal of self-regulation codes and 
legal standards. An analysis of the financial and economic 
aspects of the Consolidated Financial Statement of Parmalat 
during the four-year period 1998-2002 showed that there were 
some critical accounting areas that were not observed by the 
Parmalat controlling bodies (Bava and Devalle, 2004). The 
biggest financial scandal in Italy (an example of worst practice 
of corporate governance) gives rise to an analysis of the 
governance rules of the “new” Parmalat, which were defined 
following the group’s restructuring process with the main aim 
of regaining the trust of the markets and becoming a model of 
best practice. This paper does not intend to analyze whether the 
Italian rules of Corporate Governance are a best practice in 
Europe, but it aims at verifying whether, in the Italian 
Corporate Governance system, the “new” Parmalat governance 
can be considered a best practice of governance. Thus, this 
paper presents the results of the comparison between the “old” 
and “new” rules of Parmalat corporate governance, 
highlighting the considerable differences in the composition 
and functions of the company bodies. The Parmalat Group 
underwent a in-depth restructuring process with the main aim 
of regaining the trust of the markets and became the first public 
company (Bonicelli E. (2007), Parmalat public company, Il 
Sole 24 ore, Milano) in Italy without a strong blockholder and 
without a trade union agreement. The remainder of this paper is 
organized as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of Italy’s 
Corporate Governance System and the question research. The 
Parmalat Case Study is presented in Section 4. The paper 
concludes with a discussion of the findings and some 
indications regarding future development. 
II. BACKGROUND AND QUESTION RESEARCH  
Italian corporate governance framework and rules have 
been substantially modified since 1998 with the introduction of 
the Draghi Law.  More in general, Corporate Governance 
Reforms in Europe have been driven by three factors 
(Enriques, Volpin, 2007). First, Kamar (2006) stated that 
reforms aimed to make national markets more attractive. 
Secondly (Ferran, 2004) the efforts of the European Union was 
to institute a common framework of rules. Thirdly many of the 
corporate governance reforms are a response to national and 
international financial frauds and scandals (Enrique, 2003). 
These events have clearly shown the weakness of the 
worldwide and Italian corporate governance framework for 
both listed and non listed companies. Therefore, in order to 
rectify the situation appropriately, the legislator, has tried to 
protect minority shareholders of listed companies.  
[INS TABLE 1] 
Then the aim of this paper is to analyse if Parmalat could be 
considered a best practice of corporate governance in Italy by 
an analysis of the new and old model of governance.  
To reach the objectives described the research question is 
the following: 
 (Q1) is the “new” parmalat model of corporate 
governance a best practice in Italy after the its 
financial scandal? 
III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
The analysis is based on the Parmalat case. In particular, we 
have analysed the corporate governance system before and 
after the financial scandal. Then we compared the Parmalat 
model of corporate governance with the international Codes of 
Corporate governance. Information were collected from the 
Parmalat corporate governance report with reference to 2010 
and 2005.  
IV. RESULTS 
In order to deal with the Parmalat crisis, at the end of 
December 2003 the Italian government issued a decree law 
347/2003 (the “Parmalat decree”) to save the Italian Group 
from bankruptcy. The law introduced a series of derogations 
from the 1999 “Prodi-bis decree” and, above all, accelerated 
extraordinary administration proceedings. The special 
commissioner, Mr. Bondi, presented a Parmalat group 
industrial and restructuring plan to the Minister of Industry and 
to the main trade unions in the agro-food sector  (on 20 July 
2004). The principal aim of the plan was to free Parmalat from 
its debts, given that the company, although vulnerable, had a 
positive operating margin and could therefore be self-
sustaining. The plan emphasized the good prospects of the 
divisions identified as constituting the core business of the 
future Parmalat - UHT milk, fresh milk, milk derivatives and 
fruit juices - and envisaged the creation of a joint-stock 
company that would take over the assets of the 16 companies 
of the Parmalat group and pay their creditors . Regarding 
Parmalat’s debts, the new company would pay its secured 
creditors (the inland revenue, workers, artisans etc.) in cash, 
while paying all others with shares proportional to their claims 
against one or more of the 16 companies. The Italian 
government also provided assistance with the solution by 
giving creditor farm and haulage businesses, which had been 
affected by the crisis, access to credit on especially good terms.  
On the 17th May 2004, Parmalat Finanziaria S.p.A. 
announced the corporate governance system of the New 
Parmalat in the document outlining the restructuring plan. The 
new system took into account the norms regarding company 
law, Consob’s recommendations and the Code of Corporate 
Governance of the Italian Stock Exchange. It was also in 
keeping with the best national and international practices. The 
aim of the corporate governance system is to protect and create 
value over time for the shareholders and other parties 
concerned. This aim is increased to the rank of “statutory 
principle” due to the fact that it is placed among the duties of 
the institutions. 
The Corporate Governance of “New Parmalat” 
Parmalat’s corporate organization is based on the so-
called Italian “conventional” model (shown in paragraph 2). 
The corporate governance model also includes a series of 
powers, delegations of power, and internal control procedures, 
as well as the Parmalat Code of Conduct, a Code of Ethics, the 
Internal Dealing Handling Code and the Organization, 
Management and Control Model required by Legislative 
Decree 231/2001. The Bylaws have a particularly significant 
role in the Parmalat corporate governance model because it 
acknowledges some of the best practices of corporate 
governance, such as the obligation to set up committees within 
the Board of Directors, the separation of the CEO and the 
Chairman and the fact that the majority of the Directors must 
be independent. 
Shareholder base 
Parmalat, as mentioned above, was a family company 
with ownership concentration in only one person. On the 
contrary, “New Parmalat” is a company with a dispersed 
ownership that is a typical situation in the Anglo-Saxon and 
American companies. When defining the new governance 
rules it is necessary to consider that, if governance must be 
outlined taking into account the characteristics of the 
shareholders, it must also take into account that the structure 
of the public company was temporary  as Parmalat was 
acquired by Lactalis in 2011. The shareholders listed in Table 
2 below are believed to own, either directly or through 
representatives, nominees or subsidiaries, an interest in the 
Company that is greater than 2% of the voting shares. 
 
[INS TABLE 2] 
Board of Directors 
The Company is managed by a Board of Directors 2 
comprising 11 Directors, who are elected from slates of 
candidates. Only shareholders who, alone or together with 
other shareholders, hold a number of shares equal in the 
aggregate to at least 1% of the Company’s shares that convey 
the right to vote at Regular Shareholders’ Meetings are 
entitled to file slates of candidates. The Bylaws that require a 
rather low threshold, necessary to be able to present a slate is 
equal to 1% and aims at making it easier for minority 
shareholders to present a slate. The Bylaws require that the 
appointment of two directors is assigned by the slate presented 
by the minority shareholders3. 
                                                          
2  See Di Pietra et al. (2008), for an empirical analysis of “the 
corporate governance quality measured by the board size and the 
fraction of directors that serve on more corporate boards, influences 
the market value of a firm”. 
3 The current Board of Directors is composed of Directors present on 
only one slate that has been presented by a group of shareholders, in 
that they have not been presented on other lists.  
Existing Italian laws establish the slate-based voting (art. 147-ter 
Decree Law 58/1998); the slate can be presented by partners who 
represent at least a fortieth of the capital and at least one Director 
must be on the slate of the minority shareholders that have reached 
the highest number of votes. The slate-based voting was introduced 
after the so-called Reform on the Law of Savings (law 262, dated 
28/12/2005 and subsequent changes). 
Experts claim that the best threshold for the presentation of the lists 
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer 
The Bylaws establish that the Chairman of the Board of 
Directors is never allowed to combine his or her office with 
that of Managing Director4. This is a significant aspect, as 
such a separation is established by the Bylaws and complies 
with best governance acknowledged on an international scale5. 
Currently, at the time of writing this report, no management 
powers have been delegated to the Chairman of the Board of 
Directors and he does not perform a specific function in the 
development of Company strategies.  
 
[INS TABLE 3] 
Committees of the Board of Directors6 
The establishments of Parmalat Internal Committees, is 
governed by the Bylaws. This is important considering the fact 
that in Italy the creation of committees within the Board of 
Directors is not required by law but simply by the code of 
corporate governance. The rules governing the operation of 
the Committees are approved by the Board of Directors which 
can also integrated or modified them. The Board of Directors 
has established several internal committees that provide 
consulting support and submit proposals to the Board of 
Directors. The Board of Directors is informed about the 
activities of these Committees whenever a Board meeting is 
held. 
[INS TABLE 4] 
These Committees are: 
- Litigation Committee; 
- Nominations and Compensation Committee; 
- Internal Control and Corporate Governance 
Committee. 
                                                                                                     
should be around 1%, and should not exceed 2% (Richter jr. M.S., 
Gli amministratori non esecutivi nell’esperienza italiana, Banca 
Impresa società, 2005, n.2) 
4 It must be remembered that in the Old Parmalat the Chairman and 
the CEO were the same person, who was also the majority 
shareholder. 
5 The Code of Corporate Governance simply establishes that “the 
concentration of too many roles on one person should be avoided. 
When the Board of Directors confers executive powers to the 
Chairman, it provides suitable information in the Annual Report on 
Corporate Governance regarding the reasons for such a choice”. The 
code acknowledges the existence of situations where both roles have 
been taken on by the same person, which can be effective especially 
in smaller companies for the organisational needs, but it recommends 
that there should be a lead independent director. 
That is to say the Preda Code prefers not to make the separation of 
the two roles compulsory, even if this is the current trend in the 
Western world (Di Toro, P., Principi di comportamento del governo 
aziendale, 2008 http://www.unitus.it/ditoro/GEAbk2007-08.html.) 
6 An analysis of the Board committee is carried out in Spira L.F., 
Bender R. (2004), compare and contrast: perspectives on board 
committees. 
The Litigation Committee, which comprises three 
independent Directors without executive authority7 provides 
consulting support to the Chief Executive Officer on litigation 
related to the insolvency of the companies included in the 
Composition with Creditors. The Corporate Counsel of 
Parmalat SpA attends the meetings of this Committee. The 
opinions rendered by the Committee with regard to individual 
issues in litigation are also forwarded to the Board of 
Directors ahead of the meeting that has the issues in question 
on its Agenda. The features of New Parmalat’s Internal 
Committee compared with the previous ones are shown in 
Table 6 below: 
 
[INS TABLE 5] 
The Nominations and Compensation Committee, which 
has three independent members8 performs a proposal-making 
function. The features of New Parmalat’s Nominations and 
Compensation Committee compared with the previous ones 
are shown in Table 6 below: 
 
[INS TABLE 6] 
The Internal Control and Corporate Governance 
Committee, which comprises three independent Directors 
without executive authority (this composition is established by 
the Bylaws), performs a consulting and proposal-making 
function. Sessions of the Committee are attended by the 
Chairman of the Board of Statutory Auditors9. 
 
[INS TABLE 7] 
Internal Control System 
The Company’s internal control system is designed to 
ensure the efficient management of its corporate and business 
affairs, to make management decisions that are transparent and 
verifiable, to provide reliable accounting and operating 
information, to ensure compliance with the applicable statutes, 
to protect the Company’s integrity, and to prevent fraud 
against the Company and the financial markets in general. 
                                                          
7  The Bylaws establish that the majority of the member of this 
committee shall be independent Directors, and at least one of these 
independent Directors must be taken from a minority slate filed in 
accordance with the requirements of the Bylaws. 
8  The Bylaws establish that the majority of the member of this 
committee shall be independent Directors, and at least one of these 
independent Directors must be taken from a minority slate filed in 
accordance with the requirements of the Bylaws. If, on the one hand,  
the committee is currently composed solely of independent directors, 
on the other the Director elected from the slate that represents the 
minority shareholders is not present, in that, as has already been 
stated, the current board has been appointed on the basis of the sole 
slate presented. 
9 The Bylaws establish that at least one of its members must 
be taken from minority slate filed.  
Independent Auditors 
Parmalat auditor firm is one of a Big Four Company. 
Manager in charge of preparing company’s financial 
report 
The Manager in charge of preparing company’s financial 
report must have served as a corporate executive for at least 5 
years and he had to work in the accounting or control area or 
served in another management function at a corporation with a 
share capital of at least 2 million Euros.  
In addiction he must meet the law’s standards of integrity and 
professionalism (these requirements are set out by the 
Bylaws). 
Statutory Auditors 
The Board of Statutory Auditors comprises three Statutory 
Auditors and two Alternates, all of whom are elected on the 
basis of slates of candidates to ensure that a Statutory Auditor 
and an Alternate are elected by minority shareholders10. Only 
shareholders who, alone or together with other shareholders, 
hold a number of shares equal in the aggregate to at least 1% of 
the Company’s shares that convey the right to vote at Regular 
Shareholders’ Meetings are entitled to file slates of 
candidates11. 
 
[INS TABLE 9] 
V. CONCLUSION  
Our research reflects the currently hotly debated issue of 
corporate governance, which was recently sparked off once 
more by the crisis of the financial markets. Following the 
Parmalat crisis, there have been many changes to the laws and 
regulations and code of corporate governance in Italy, with the 
aim of strengthening the governance system of listed 
companies. In order to provide the restructuring process of the 
Parmalat group has been necessary to totally rethink the 
                                                          
10  Furthermore the Bylaws establish that the Statutory Auditors 
elected by the minority list should take on the role of Chairman of the 
Board of Statutory Auditors. It is currently a legal obligation that was 
introduced by the reform of the Savings Law. 
11 Ferrarini and Giudici, (2005) underlined in their paper that  “The 
Bylaws of the old Parmalat allowed minority shareholders 
representing at least 3% of the voting rights to appoint a statutory 
auditor”. Such a high percentage made the nomination of Statutory 
Auditors by minority shareholders difficult. Nevertheless, in 1999 
“institutional investors were successful in appointing a statutory 
auditor to Parmalat’s board. However, at the end of her three-year 
term in 2002 the minority appointed auditor informed the institutional 
investors that she was not available for reappointment. It is rumoured 
that her decision was construed by the industry as an alarm signal. As 
a consequence, many funds sold Parmalat shares and thus at the 
general meeting of 2002 institutional investors were not able to reach 
the required threshold and therefore could not appoint a statutory 
auditor for the minority shareholders. If confirmed, this account 
would add credibility to the idea that well before the end of 2002 
information concerning Parmalat’s problems was buried in the 
market”  
Corporate Governance since New Parmalat was born with the 
main objective of regaining the trust from the market that they 
had lost. This issue has generated an interest in the “Parmalat 
Case”, and is the subject of this paper, which highlights the 
main characteristics of the new governance model, identifying 
the numerous positive aspects which, in some cases, have been 
accepted by the legislator and integrated in the reform on the 
Savings Law. So this paper does not intend to analyze whether 
the Italian rules of Corporate Governance are a best practice in 
Europe, but aims at verifying whether the “New” Parmalat 
governance could be considered a best practice of governance 
in the Italian Corporate Governance system. The main rules 
that can be considered examples of best governance for Italian 
listed companies are discussed in detail in paragraph 3, and 
include: 
a. the provision in the Bylaws that the majority of 
Directors be independent (at least 6 out of 11); 
b. Considering that the key distinctions are inside 
directors versus outside directors, and then affiliated 
outside directors versus independent outside 
directors, there is far more awareness today of the 
importance of having truly independent board 
members. European trends show the number of 
independent directors is on the rise, especially among 
large company. In Italy the listing requirements of 
Draghi law and Preda Code include detailed 
definition of independence, but as many corporate 
governance experts say “Indipendence is much more 
that checking the right boxes. It is a state of mind – 
the willingness of be honest, to disagree, and to speak 
up.” Anyway the majority of independent directors is 
highly useful to “check and balance” the boards. 
Many studies of outsider ratios and corporate 
performance have produced correlations between 
independence of corporate boards and improvements 
in corporate performance12. 
c. Considering listed firms have to render themselves 
attractive to investors at large, listed companies 
voluntarily design their boards to give minority 
shareholders better protection. A minority 
representation guarantee separation of power and 
cater to shareholders at large, more over guarantee 
against expropriation by controlling shareholders and 
managers13.     
d. the provision in the Bylaws of the creation of 
committees within the Board of Directors and the 
election in each committee of an independent  
Director chosen from the list presented by the 
minority shareholders; 
Essential to the effective functioning of a board is a 
well-conceived committee structure. This is due 
because small groups can function more frequently in 
                                                          
12 See Pearce and Zahra (1992),  McKinsey&Company (2002), 
Niamh Brennan and Michael McDermott (2004).  
13 See Berkman, Cole, & Fu (2009); Cheung, Rau, & Stouraitis, 
(2006), (2010); Dharwadkar, George, & Brandes, (2000); Young et 
al., (2008). 
a committee-of-the-whole mode 14 . In particular, 
committees can yeld big advantages focusing 
attention on important and specific iusses. Keeping in 
mind that: “Whatever the committee structure is, 
committees should report to the full board and should 
not, expect in unusual circumstances, themselves 
exercise the power to decide 15 ”. Committees are 
highly useful to establish and increase  the 
independence and power of non-executive directors. 
At the moment of the introduction in the Parmalat 
governance committees were already well established 
in the Anglo-America world.   
e. the separation, as established by the Bylaws, of the 
role of CEO and the role of Chairman of the Board of 
Directors; 
For sure, the relationship between the board and the 
CEO is one of the most hotly debated issues in 
corporate governance. The separation between 
Chairman and CEO is the norm today in UK and 
Canada. But, in Italy, the situation at beginning of the 
last decade was completely different. The reasons 
were, first of all, the different ownership structure, 
but also the belief of improving the leadership inside 
the board. How Dick Debs (Morgan Stanley) said: 
“corporate disasters can be traced to concentrating 
power at the top”. Splitting the two main roles inside 
the board helps to generate antagonism e and 
balancing the power.  
Some of these examples of best governance have been 
either partially or wholly integrated by the legislator (point b), 
some others are requested by the code of corporate governance 
(points c and d), whereas others are not required at legislative 
or regulatory level (a and e). The study of the governance 
model has also provided the opportunity to identify some less 
positive aspects which may be considered worth analyzing: 
a) the presence of an independent Director who is also 
the CEO of another important Italian listed group; 
b) the composition of the Supervisory Board 
(Legislative Decree 231/2001) 
c) the reporting activities of the Internal Auditing 
Officer to the CEO. 
Within the Italian listed companies framework it can 
thus be stated that New Parmalat’s corporate governance 
model has many of the characteristics that make it a best 
practice model. Moreover, each model can always be modified 
and improved upon, in order to optimise the costs in economic 
terms with the benefits. The simply complying with corporate 
governance rules does not automatically mean that the 
company is being run correctly. Good governance can be 
obtained by striking the right balance between compliance to 
the rules and attention to performance (Riccaboni A., 
                                                          
14 Bowen. W. G., The board book, Norton, pag. 150. 
15 Bowen. W. G., The board book, Norton, pag. 150. 
Guindani P., 2008). In this framework, the financial 
community plays an important role, as Financial investors and 
market operators have to consider the monitoring of the short-
term results to be not the only important aspect, as it is 
necessary in the meantime to evaluate the ability of the 
Company to create value in a long term period, following an 
ethical behavior, and satisfying the stakeholders’ interests 
(Riccaboni A., Guindani P., 2008). 
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TABLE 1 – ITALIAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK. 
 
TABLE 2  – SHAREHOLDER WITH MORE THAN 2% OF THE VOTING SHARES 
Shareholder Percentage 
FIR TREE INC. 2,287% 
UBS AG 2,382% 
MACKENZIE CUNDILL INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT LTD 2,348% 
GOLDMAN SACHS ASSET MANAGEMENT L.P. 2,013% 
INTESA SANPAOLO SPA 2,438% 
JP MORGAN CHASE & CO. CORPORATION 3,026% 
Total shareholders with significant equity interest 14,494% 
    Source: Consob – 27.10.2008 
Shareholder Percentage 
MACKENZIE CUNDILL INVESTMENTS MANAGEMENT LTD 7,557% 
BLACKROCK, INC. 4,945% 
SKAGEN AS 5,009% 
TOTALE GRUPPO INTESA S. PAOLO 2,321% 
NORGES BANK INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT 2,023% 
Total shareholders with significant equity interest 21,86% 
    Source: Consob – 18.08.2011 
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(*) Second
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TABLE 3 - OLD AND NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ABOUT THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
Board of Directors New Parmalat Old Parmalat 
Number of components of the  Board 
of Directors 
11 (the number of Directors  established by the Bylaws) The Bylaws established a number of between five 
and fifteen Directors 
Election procedure Slates of candidates. Threshold equal to at least 1% of the 
Company’s shares 
The presentation of the slate was not required prior 
to the meeting 
Process Presentation at least 10 days beforehand: 
 official acceptance of the candidates; 
 certification that there is no legal reason to prevent the 
election of the candidate; 
 certification of necessary requisites; 
 curriculum vitae. 
Not established 
Independent Directors 9 (at least 6 in compliance with the  Bylaws) 3 (according to the statements found in the annual 
report on corporate governance) 
Corporate Governance Posts  The same person may not serve both as Chairman of the Board of 
Directors and Chief Executive Officer 
Allowed 
Board Evaluation The board evaluation process was carried out by requesting that 
all members fill out a questionnaire.  
Not established 
TABLE 4: FEATURES OF NEW PARMALAT’S INTERNAL COMMITTEE 
 New Parmalat Old Parmalat 
Internal Committees  The establishments of Internal Committees is governed by 
Bylaws. 
These committees are: 
 Litigation Committee; 
 Nominations and Compensation Committee; 
 Internal Control and Corporate Governance Committee. 
The following had been set up: 
 the Internal Control Committee 
 the Compensation Committee 
Compensation of the 
Board of Directors 
The compensation of the Board of Directors is determined by 
the Shareholder’s Meeting and does not change until the 
Shareholder’s Meeting approves a new resolution. 
The compensation of the Board of Directors is determined by the 
Shareholder’s Meeting and does not change until the 
Shareholder’s Meeting approves a new resolution. 
TABLE 5 – THE LITIGATION COMMITEEE 
 New Parmalat Old Parmalat 
Composition Three independent Directors without executive authority Not established 
Nomination The Bylaws establish that at least one of its members must be drawn from a 
minority slate 
Function Provides consulting support to the CEO on litigation related to the insolvency of 
the companies included in the Composition with Creditors. 
TABLE 6 – THE NOMINATIONS AND COMPENSATION COMMITTEE 
 New Parmalat Old Parmalat 
Composition Three independent Directors without executive authority.  
The Bylaws establish that the majority of the members of this committee 
shall be independent Directors. 
It was solely a Compensation Committee.  
Nomination The Bylaws establish that  at least one of its members must be drawn from a 
minority slate. 
It was composed of three members: two were 
independent and one had executive authority. 
TABLE 7 – THE INTERNAL CONTROL AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE COMMITTEE 
Old Parmalat New Parmalat 
Composition Three independent Directors without executive authority 
Sessions of the Committee are attended by the Chairman of the Board of Statutory 
Auditors. 
Two were independent and one had  
executive authority. 
Nomination The Bylaws establish that at least one of its members must be drawn from a minority 
slate 
By the Board of Directors  
 
TABLE 9 - STATUTORY AUDITORS 
 New Parmalat Old Parmalat 
Number of components  3 3 
Election procedure Slates of candidates – Threshold equal to  at least 1% of the 
Company’s shares 
 
Chairmanship of the Statutory Board goes to the first 
candidate on the list that is second for the number of votes 
Slates of candidates – Threshold equal to at least 3% of the 
Company’s shares 
 
Chairmanship of the Statutory Board goes to the first 
candidate on the list that is first for the number of votes 
Process Presentation at least 10 days beforehand: 
 official acceptance of the candidates; 
 certification that there is no legal reason to prevent 
the election of the candidate; 
 certification of necessary requisites 
 curriculum vitae 
Presentation at least 10 days beforehand: 
 official acceptance of the candidates; 
 certification that there is no legal reason to prevent 
the election of the candidate; 
 certification of necessary requisites 
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